Perception of residual value risk in public private partnership projects : critical review by Yuan, J et al.
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
No
t C
op
ye
dit
ed
 1 / 51 
 
The perception of residual value risk in Public Private 
Partnership projects: a critical review  
 
Jingfeng Yuan1, Albert P. C. Chan2, Wei Xiong3, Mirosław J. Skibniewski4 Qiming Li5 
1 Lecturer, Department of Construction and Real Estate, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, P. R. China. Tel. & Fax: 
86 25 8379 3251; Visiting Researcher, Department of Building and Real Estate, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 
Hung Hum, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China; E-mail: 101011337@seu.edu.cn 
2 Professor, Department of Building and Real Estate, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hum, Kowloon, Hong 
Kong, China. Email: bsachan@inet.polyu.edu.hk 
3 Ph. D. student, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China. Email: kevinxiong@ust.hk 
4 Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA; 
E-mail: mirek@umd.edu 
5 Professor and Head, Department of Construction and Real Estate, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, P. R. China. 
Tel. & Fax: 86 25 8379 3251; E-mail: njlqming@163.com  
 
 
 
Abstracts: Given the increased demand for public facilities and the lack of funds and skills to maintain, 
repair, and replenish the existing facilities, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been adopted widely 
and they have contributed significantly to the development of new built infrastructures throughout the 
world. However, as many PPP projects will be transferred back to the host governments upon expiry of the 
concession period, problems related to the subsequent management of PPP projects have not been studied 
thoroughly to date. Residual Value Risk (RVR) is a critical issue when the projects revert back to the public 
sector. Through an extensive literature review and an open-ended questionnaire survey, the perception of 
RVR in PPP projects is elaborated in this paper which aims at presenting a precise definition and meaning 
of RVR in PPP projects. The survey results indicate that RVR is viewed as an important issue by 
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professionals and academics. The definition of RVR can be phrased as “the risk that on expiry or earlier 
termination of the services contract, the asset (tangible or intangible) is not in accordance with the value 
originally estimated by government, at which the private party agreed to transfer it to government, where 
public sectors could suffer loss of the residual value, and the private sector partner also could suffer a loss 
of compensation from the government due to different residual value”. Six critical risk factors leading to 
RVR are identified in this paper, namely, (1) Downfall of product or service performance; (2) Functional 
problems; (3) Decrease of profitability and low possibility of refinancing; (4) Deterioration of 
maintainability; (5) Decline in operability; (6) Failure of sustainability. On the basis of the proposed RVR 
model, the cumulative effects of the interaction of different risk factors are identified. The proposed RVR 
definition and its associated RVR risk factors in PPP projects can be considered for use by the public sector 
to better regulate and manage PPP projects and facilitate the development of PPP projects from the 
regulatory and financial planning perspective.  
 
Key words: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), Residual Value Risk (RVR), Risk identification, 
Cumulative effects of risk categories, Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) 
 
Introduction 
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been extensively adopted by the public sector in many countries to 
facilitate the development of infrastructure. The critical objectives for governments to utilize PPPs are to 
overcome the shortcomings of capital capability, poor management skills, and low technology level (Yuan 
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et al. 2010b; Chan et al. 2010; Jooste et al. 2011). PPP projects should be able to provide quality public 
goods and services through skilled construction and experienced operation by the private sector during the 
concession period (Ng et al. 2010; Chan et al. 2010). Value for money (VfM) is commonly used by the 
public sector to assess the feasibility of PPPs. In order to achieve VfM, efforts should be made by both the 
public and private sectors in the aspects of project planning and design, construction management, 
maintenance, facility management, staff training, and technology progress, etc (Heald 2003; Grimsey and 
Lewis 2005; Sobhiyah et al. 2009). PPP projects with a typical concession period from 15 to 30 years are 
usually under the operation of the private sector, while the governance of projects has been reported as 
weak and ineffective in many cases due to limited control and monitoring by the public sector (Yuan et al. 
2010a; Wibowo and Kochendoerfer 2011; Zhang 2006). Furthermore, Residual Value Risk (RVR) could 
arise when the project is to be transferred back to the government at the end of the PPP agreement or in 
earlier termination because the estimated value cannot be achieved according to Her Majesty's Treasury of 
United Kingdom (HM Treasury of UK 2007) and Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2009).  
 
Partnerships Victoria (2001) defines RVR as the risk that on expiry or earlier termination of the services 
contract, the asset does not have the value originally estimated by government at which the private party 
agreed to transfer it to government. RVR is a structured risk system which would occur at any time before 
transfer of PPP projects to the public sector, and consequently the Residual Value (RV) to the Government 
cannot fulfill the specifications. Suitable management of RVR would be of tremendous value for better 
maintenance, easier transfer of the PPP projects, improvement of on-going management, and sustainable 
development of the infrastructure (Hall 1998). Otherwise, many problems like high maintenance cost, low 
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quality service, and functional problems of the facilities would occur (Algarni et al. 2007).  
 
Most of the PPP or PFI (Private Finance Initiative) projects have a clear specification in terms of the 
performance and condition of the transferred project (HM Treasury of UK 2007). Nevertheless, high 
residual value would be lost upon RVR occurs (Private Finance Panel 1996). The RVR is influenced by 
many factors. During the processing of project, the public sector may neglect the impact of residual value 
change and the risk may be huge when the project is being transferred because of the cumulative impacts 
(Algarni et al. 2007). Many disputes and losses can arise from poor maintenance of the assets, in which the 
public sector cannot obtain the return in the desired condition (Infrastructure Australia 2008a). 
 
Although prior studies have identified RVR as an important risk factor in PPPs (Private Finance Panel 1996; 
Hall 1998; Froud 2003; Algarni et al. 2007; Jin 2011), the risks at the stage of transfer have not be studied 
systematically because most PPP projects have a long concession period and few projects have been 
transferred at present. As presented by Infrastructure Australia (2008a), the residual value calculation 
depends on the nature of the asset, historic residual value estimates, the expected market for the assets and 
the expected monetary benefit (or cost) to government. Therefore, this study attempts to provide an 
overview on RVR in PPPs, and offers a clear definition of RVR. Additionally, a conceptual model 
composed of leading indicators of RVR is also established to assist the public sector to measure and 
manage RVR during the lifecycle of PPP projects.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the methodology used in the paper. The third 
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section gives an extensive literature review on RVR. The fourth section introduces the structured interview 
survey of opinions from PPP experts and professionals on the definition and contents of RVR in PPPs. The 
fifth section establishes a conceptual model to monitor and manage RVR by identifying leading indicators 
of RVR. Finally, the paper closes with conclusions. 
 
Research method 
 
In this study, a series of qualitative research methods were used to derive the definition and contents of 
RVR in PPPs, and to explore the conceptual indicator system of RVR to measure and manage RVR in PPPs 
effectively.  
 
First of all, an extensive review of relevant research papers was conducted. As the RV mainly contains 
tangible and intangible assets (Efficiency Unit of Hong Kong 2003), the literature review was developed 
from these two aspects. These research papers related to PPP and residual value risks provide a good 
picture of the history and the current perception of RV and RVR in different fields. In addition, the recently 
published official and political documents provide authoritative evidence of the government’s attitudes 
towards RVR in PPPs (Partnerships Victoria 2001; Efficiency Unit of Hong Kong 2003; European 
Commission 2003; HM Treasury of UK 2007; Infrastructure Australia 2008a, 2008b; Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India 2009). Second, the initial definition of RVR proposed by the authors was 
discussed with 46 PPP experts and professionals to clarify the definition and contents of RVR in PPP 
projects. The method of web-based interview was used in the empirical survey. Data analysis was then 
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conducted. Third, a conceptual model was established on the basis of findings from the literature review 
and interview survey. The model contains multiple leading indicators of RVR to help the public sector 
measure RVR and find ways to reduce RVR. Meanwhile, the potential use of conceptual models was 
discussed, aiming at not just detecting and explaining but also improving the present state of RVR 
management in real PPP projects, and to be helpful in developing risk management in PPPs in the future.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Literature review 
 
Risk management and related studies in PPPs 
 
In the last two decades, PPPs have become a popular way of procuring major infrastructure projects (Tiong 
et al. 1996; Hodge 2004; Shen et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2011). However, effective risk management has 
become a critical issue for the success of a project due to long term and sophisticated contract conditions in 
PPPs (Zhang 2005). Based on the findings of Ke et al. (2009), the top 5 frequently cited papers in the field 
of PPP are all risk-related research. Tang et al. (2010) also indicate that risks are always an active research 
topic for PPP projects.  
 
Prior works on PPPs’ risk management include risk identification, risk evaluation, risk allocation, and risk 
management framework (Ke et al. 2009). Risk identification is always the first step for risk management. In 
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the PPP context, risk identification focuses on specific countries and regions (e.g. China, India, US, UK, et 
al.) and specific project type (e.g. transportation, water treatment, power plant, education, et al.). Very 
important conclusion drawn from research on PPPs is that government-related risks and financial risks are 
the most significant risks for ongoing PPP projects, not only in developing countries but also in developed 
countries (Lam and Chow 1999; Wang et al. 1999; Thomas et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2011). In view of the 
high risk features in the context of PPPs, it is very important that risks are deemed to be appropriately 
allocated to both the public and private sectors considering their risk management capabilities and certain 
internal and external conditions. Therefore, risk allocation is considered as an effective risk treatment 
method in many prior studies. Numerous risk allocation mechanisms and frameworks have been designed 
by using empirical studies and computer-based modeling (Li et al. 2005; Abednego and Ogunlana 2006; Ng 
and Loosemore 2007; Jin 2010; Ke at al. 2010). Meanwhile, the establishment of a risk management 
framework is dependent on effective risk evaluation (Akintoye et al. 2005). A series of qualitative risk 
evaluation frameworks have been proposed to measure overall risks in PPP projects to improve risk 
management (Wang et al. 2000a; Akintoye et al. 2001; Grimsey and Lewis 2002). Moreover, quantitative 
models are formulated to measure specific risks like political risks, financial risks, foreign exchange risks, 
and revenue risks (Wang et al. 2000b; Ye and Tiong 2000; Xenidis and Angelides 2005; Singh and 
Kalidindi 2006). Overall, researches to date have strengthened the perceptions of industry and academics 
on PPP risks and can be helpful to explore the appropriate ways for managing important risks.  
 
Residual value risk in PPPs  
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Generally, residual value risk in PPPs can be described as the uncertainty that the residual value could be 
lower than the estimated or anticipated value determined in the PPP contact when being transferred, which 
means the residual value would suffer losses during the lifecycle of the PPP project under the impact of 
different factors. However, there are many different perceptions of RVR in PPP projects in prior studies.  
 
? The significances of RVR are different.  
 
Previous studies have identified RVR as a critical risk that will have a strong influence on the value of 
initial bids and the incentives facing contractors. Hall (1998) demonstrates that the assets created under 
PPP deals typically have an expected useful life beyond the formal contract period and risks associated 
with how many the assets will be worth when a PPP project is transferred to public sectors is very 
important. Algarni et al. (2007) advocate that facility assets have been suffering from years of neglect, 
overuse, deferred maintenance, and delayed repair and finally result in RVR that would harm the 
sustainable development of the infrastructure. Meanwhile, RVR has a strong relationship with asset 
ownership as presented by Froud (2003) and Jin (2010). 
 
On the other hand, opposing views are also presented in previous reports and research. The Private Finance 
Panel (1996) argues that “There is no need for the public sector to concern itself with the residual value of 
an asset in a carefully structured PFI contract”. A recent survey on the opinions of PPP risks shows that 
RVR is the least important risk factors in China (Xu et al. 2010).  
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The different opinions on RVR firstly reflect the perceptions of different stakeholders based on their own 
stand. From the perspectives of the public sector, long-term sustainable operation of PPP projects is very 
important. Hence many official documents confirm that RVR is significant (Partnerships Victoria 2001; 
Infrastructure Australia 2008a, 2008b; Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2009). In the survey 
conducted by Xu et al. (2010), data also show that opinions on residual value risk are different for 
academics and industrial practitioners (most are from private sector) in China. The academics perceived 
that the problem of residual value is more severe than industrial practitioners believe, based on the 
viewpoints of the public sector and the general public. Emphasizing and safeguarding the public benefits 
are the motivation to discuss RVR. On the contrary, the private sector is focusing on short-term return on 
investment (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009), which hinders the significance of RVR from being recognized. 
Secondly, the RVR problem could be neglected because many ongoing PPP projects have not been 
transferred to the public sector and the loss of RV has not been recognized. In the same report, the Private 
Finance Panel (1996) also cautions that the asset may well not be what was required a long time ago in any 
case: ‘‘the assumption that any asset created now will be suitable in its present form to deliver a further 
contract after some 25 years is questionable. The client’s operational needs will change”. A carefully 
structured contract is the reason for ignorance of RVR according to the Private Finance Panel (1996). 
However, perfect agreement is almost impossible because future changes cannot be well predicted and 
corresponding clauses are difficult to be designed (Iyer and Sagheer 2010; Krüger 2012). Therefore, it is 
very necessary to discuss RVR, which can be identified from the above-mentioned statement.  
 
? The methods to treat RVR are different.  
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Froud (2003) deliberated that RVR can be dealt with by writing oﬀ the asset completely over the life of the 
contract and should be transferred to public when contract ends. On the contrary, Arndt (1998) illustrated 
that RVR should be transferred to the private sector. Li et al. (2005) conducted a survey on risk allocation 
preference in the UK. The results indicated different opinions amongst the respondents (22% of 
respondents thought that RVR should be transferred to the public sector, sharing the RVR is proposed by 
23% respondents, and transferring to the private sectors is proposed by 55% respondents). Ke et al. (2010) 
also concluded that residual (value) risks should be shared by the public and private sectors. The 
differences amongst methods to treat RVR reflect that the perception of RVR is still unclear. RV would 
suffer loss due to many factors during the concession period of PPP projects. Public and private sectors 
should both be responsible for the management of RVR. Therefore, how to keep RV at a high level should 
be further explored.  
 
Knowledge gap 
 
Although prior works have mentioned RVR in PPPs as presented earlier, there are few works focusing on 
the residual value risk in PPP projects so far. The significance of RVR in PPPs has not been fully 
recognized by both the public and private sectors. Xu et al. (2010) illustrated that RVR has been viewed as 
a potential threat to successful implementation of PPP projects. Prior research indicated that RVR should be 
allocated to the public sectors as they are the asset owner on the expiry of the PPP contract (Marques and 
Berg 2011; Krüger 2012). However, Chan et al. (2011) concluded that residual (value) risk is a result of 
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investors’ overuse resources like equipment or other technical instruments, etc., which cause insufficient 
materials and equipment with depreciation at the end of the concession period. Consequently, RVR affects 
the continuous operation of the projects. Before RVR occurs, the infrastructure itself might have massively 
deteriorated already. In the light of important impacts on society and economy, it would be too late to deal 
with RVR only when the project is transferred.  
 
According to the review on previous studies, the knowledge gaps can be identified. The different opinions 
on the significance of RVR are caused by three knowledge gaps: (1) The RV of PPP projects can be viewed 
as a type of asset. However the importance of RVR for different stakeholders could be various because they 
do not have a very clear perception on RVR in PPPs. Therefore the definition and content of RVR should 
be further clarified, although RVR has been classified to asset ownership-based risk. What is RVR in PPPs? 
What are the assets in PPP projects and how will they vary in the lifecycle of PPP project? (2) Most PPP 
projects are at the stage of planning, negotiation, construction, or operation. More attention is put on current 
issues or possibly important issues in the near future as a matter of course. However, long-term vision on 
the PPP projects is essential for pursuing public benefits. In order to realize public benefits, the RV of PPP 
projects should be kept at a high level, and government should identify what factors would lead to RVR 
and which indicators can be used to measure and indicate risk factors? (3) Different opinions on the 
methods to treat RVR can not only reflect the unclear definition of RVR, but also propose another question: 
What is an effective risk management framework to evaluate risk in advance, and what are the 
corresponding risk treatment measures? This paper attempts to fill these knowledge gaps with particular 
emphasis on (1). The knowledge gap (2) and (3) will be partially involved.  
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Residual Value and potential risks in PPPs 
Residual value is one of the constituents of a leasing operation, which describes the future value of goods in 
terms of the percentage of depreciation from its initial value. As advocated by Lucko and Vorster (2003), 
terminology that is used to describe the concept of residual value varies widely in the literature, including 
market value, salvage value, resale value, and trade-in value. In accounting, the residual value can be 
defined as an estimated amount that an entity can obtain when disposing of an asset after its useful life has 
ended (Pirottea and Vaessen 2008). When doing this, the estimated costs of disposing of the asset should be 
deducted. The residual value of equipment therefore could be the price that can be achieved by disposing of 
a used machine in a fair transaction between an equally well informed buyer and seller in the overall market 
with a particular economic situation (Lucko et al. 2007; Fan et al. 2008).  
 
However, it would be hard to define the value of PPP projects when they are transferred to the public sector. 
RVR usually is defined as asset ownership-based risk (Sobhiyah et al. 2009; Ke et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2012; 
HM Treasury of UK 2007; Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2009; Xu et al. 2010; Chan et al. 
2011). Based on the Oxford Dictionary definition, an asset is a thing of value, especially property, that a 
person or company owns which can be used or sold to pay debts. In essence, an asset could be capital, 
estate, funds, goods, holdings, means, money, possessions, property, resources, savings, securities, and 
wealth. Hence, the RV of a PPP project should be the RV of assets for PPP projects. In this case, the RV 
mainly contains two parts: tangible assets and intangible assets.  
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? Tangible assets are those that have a physical substance and can be touched, including current assets 
and fixed assets. Current assets include inventory, while fixed assets include facilities, technical files, 
tolls, equipment and instrument etc.  
? Intangible assets are nonphysical resources and rights that have a value to a company because they 
give some kind of advantage in the market place. Examples of intangible assets are organization, 
intellectual property, reputation, and market share, and financial assets, including such items 
as accounts receivable, bonds and stocks.  
 
On the other hand, the private sector actually delivers services and not assets through PPPs (Comptroller 
and Auditor General of India 2009). Thus the focus of the public sector should be more on the performance 
of the private sector in delivering the services according to the stipulated service levels to ensure that the 
asset could revert back in a reasonable (but not new) condition at the time of transfer, when the assets 
should still have residual economic lifespan.  
 
Therefore, the residual value of a PPP project is the value of PPP assets at the end of a specified period of 
time in a given conditions, where the value of PPP projects can be classified to value of tangible asset and 
intangible asset. Both of tangible assets and intangible assets should ensure that the infrastructure facility 
can be operated with perfect function and performance, favorable capital status, and complete organization 
structure and human resource to keep on delivering high quality service after PPP projects being 
transferring back to public sectors or other service providers, which means the given conditions include not 
only financial conditions like equipment market price or historical leasing data for a building but also 
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non-financial conditions (e.g. physical conditions of facilities and historical risk events) that would strongly 
influence RV of a PPP projects. As a result, the implication of RV in PPPs has surpassed the scope of 
traditional definition of RV in accounting or in leasing industry. Intangible assets play very important roles 
in the change.  
 
In prior studies, residual value of a PPP project has a close relationship with depreciation (Heald 2003). 
Lucko and Vorster (2003) indicate that residual value is fundamentally different from depreciation whose 
originated meaning in cost accounting is the process of determining the book value of an asset for 
administrative and taxation purposes by regularly charging expenses to the initial capital investment based 
on a prescribed model. Numerous models, like the straight line model and the declining balance model, 
have been used in the calculation of depreciation (Lucko 2003). However, these models cannot consider 
any actual changes in the projects or the external circumstances under which it is transferred. For example, 
a toll road’s residual value could be influenced by the level and frequency of maintenance, the private 
sector’s capability of facility management, the change of traffic flow, and the market shares at the time of 
being transferring. In some PPP guidelines (Infrastructure Australia 2008b), the value is assumed to a zero 
book value by depreciation at the end of PPP contract and possibly used for the purpose of minimizing the 
tax liability of the company, which cannot reflect the real value and operating cost of PPP projects and the 
real-time market place. From this perspective, the confusion of depreciation and residual value would 
clearly demonstrate why RVR have not been paid enough attention. In fact, the possible loss of value in 
PPP projects could result from multiple factors. For example, government-related risks and financial risks 
are the most important risks in PPPs as mentioned above. These risks could finally impact on RV and 
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consequently lead to RVR. Therefore, further research on RVR in PPP projects should be conducted to help 
the public sector better understand how the RVR occurs and how to manage and measure the RVR.  
The research survey on RVR 
 
Introduction of survey 
 
As the definition and content of RVR are not clear, a research survey was conducted to tap in expert 
knowledge of PPP practitioners and professionals. Because of the exploratory character of the research, the 
defined survey method was by questionnaire using open-ended questions. The advantage of open-end 
questions is that the information gathered by way of the responses is more likely to reflect the full richness 
and complexity of the views held by the respondents (Ling et al. 2009). Many previous studies use 
open-ended questions as primary survey methods (Keane et al. 2010; Kheni et al. 2010; Xia and Chan, 
2012). Open-ended questions allow respondents to have greater freedom in sharing their experience and 
knowledge.  
 
In the questionnaire, an initial definition based on a literature review from the perspective of the public 
sector was presented. The respondents were asked in an open-ended manner to indicate their full opinion on 
the definition without restriction and to provide any supplements to the definition. The questionnaire 
consists of two parts (Appendix 1). Part A consists of six questions aimed at gathering data on the 
respondents’ background. The first question in part B helps improve the definition of RVR. The second 
question in part B collects useful information from respondents about the contents of RVR and helps 
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identify the most common elements. The third question in part B asks about the magnitude of RVR. The 
fourth question in part B is another open-ended question to identify respondents’ perceptions on how to 
treat RVR by using PPP contracts. The last question gathers experts’ further suggestions on the research. 
 
It is important to identify and select potential members to constitute a panel of experts to provide answers 
to open-end questions in an exploratory survey. Therefore, the participants are selected based on two 
criteria (1) Practitioners who have extensive working experience within the construction industry; (2) 
Experts who have been involved in the management of PPP projects or have gained in-depth knowledge of 
the PPP model through research.  
 
The survey was sent to a sample of 148 experts from March 2010 to May 2010 (Table 1). Answers were 
obtained from 46 respondents. The information of respondents can be obtained from Part A. 15 respondents 
were from mainland China, 8 respondents from Hong Kong, 7 respondents from United States, 5 
respondents from Singapore, 5 respondents from Australia, and the others from Europe (UK and 
Netherland). The questions were designed to collect data on the respondents’ profiles and the definition and 
content of RVR in PPPs. A response rate of 38.02% was achieved, which can be considered acceptable 
when compared with other recent construction research surveys using open-end questions: 37% in Keane et 
al. (2010), 37% in Kheni et al. (2010), and 48.38% in Xia and Chan (2011). Demographic details of the 
experts can be found in Table 2. These experts represent a wide spectrum of PPP professionals and they can 
provide a balanced view for the survey. 28.26% of the respondents came from the private sector, 47.83% 
from the public sector and the remaining respondents mainly comprised researchers and academics. More 
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than 75% of the respondents had at least 5 years of industrial experience, and nearly 75% of the 
respondents had been involved with more than one PPP project. This hands-on working experience and the 
relevant organizations of the selected experts uphold the validity of this study. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Analysis of the results  
 
As shown in Table 3, some information can be analyzed by using descriptive statistics method to obtain 
research findings.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
? The significance of RVR in PPPs 
Actually, the significance of RVR in PPPs cannot be directly obtained by open-end questionnaire. 
Therefore, the opinions of respondents on the significance of RVR in PPPs can be derived from the answers 
of question 3 and 4 in Part B. The answers of question 3 can reflect the urgency of considering RVR in 
PPPs in real projects, which indicates that high urgency means high significance. In the answer of question 
3, whether the RVR has been considered in the contract in PPP projects can also reflect the significance of 
RVR in PPPs. The detailed scale from “extremely important” to “not important” is also shown in Table 3. 
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58%, 25%, and 12% of respondents considered RVR as an extremely important, very important, and 
important issue in formulating PPPs, respectively. Notwithstanding slightly different opinions on RVR in 
PPPs, the RVR can be viewed as very significant issue with high urgency based on the survey data. As there 
are many maintenance problems in ongoing PPP projects, RVR in PPPs could occur with very high 
possibility by respondents in prior studies (European Investment Bank 2005; Xu et al 2012; Javed et al 
2013; Cruz and Marques 2013). The evidence is that the output specification set in the PPP contract will be 
obsolete and cannot meet the requirements when transferring projects back to the public sector because the 
technological and economical lifespans are shorter than the physical lifespans for an infrastructure project 
(Javed et al 2013). Technology progress and reasonable equipment renewal would greatly benefit reducing 
RVR in PPPs. Only 5% of respondents considered RVR as an important issue, and no respondents think 
RVR is not important issue. In their opinions, very detailed specification for transferring PPP projects and 
strict contract conditions, which are obtained from respondents’ suggestions based on the answers of 
question 5 in Part B, can help avoid the RVR in PPPs.  
 
? The definition of RVR in PPP projects 
According to the report of Partnerships Victoria (2001), the RVR can be defined as “the risk that on expiry 
or earlier termination of the services contract the asset does not have the value originally estimated by 
government at which the private party agreed to transfer it to government based on the perspective of 
public sectors”, and was proposed in the survey and sought respondents’ opinions. The respondents’ 
opinions of question 1 in Part B indicated a high degree of agreement on the definition. No respondents 
disagreed with the definition. 78.25% of respondents agreed with the definition, and 21.75% of respondents 
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basically agreed with the definition. More useful information can be obtained from the survey, profiting 
from the open-ended manner. Some typical suggestions provided by respondents are shown in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
? The contents of RVR in PPP projects 
Based on the answers of question 2 in Part B, RVR in PPPs has relationships with facilities that was 
mentioned by 100% of respondents, technical documents (95%), project organization (95%), equipment 
(87%), intellectual property (86%), instruments (65%), project reputation and goodwill (54%), and market 
shares (49%). In the PPP context, the meaning of the content could be varied, and explanations and 
examples or references are shown in Table 5.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
? The methods to treat RVR in PPPs by using contract  
With respect to the treatment of RVR, a contract signed by both the public and private sectors is an 
effective approach to manage, control, and reduce risks including RVR (Nisar 2006). The information 
collected by the answers of question 4 in Part B also showed that RVR has been considered in contracts in 
most actual PPP projects. Based on the data presented in Table 3, 14 respondents have not considered RVR 
in the project contract. As 12 respondents have not been involved in any PPP projects according to Table 2, 
the RVR was not considered by only 2 respondents.  
 
However, respondents have different opinions on using renegotiation to dynamically treat RVR in the 
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project process. 19 respondents that agreed with renegotiation insisted that not all risks as well as their 
impacts can be included and predicted in the contract. Once RV is influenced by related risks and cannot 
meet the expectation of public sectors, renegotiation is a possible method to resolve problems (Medda 2007; 
Koppenjan and Enserink 2009). Meanwhile, the prerequisite of renegotiation should be clarified in the 
contract. On the other hand, 13 respondents that disagreed with renegotiation insisted that renegotiation was 
not reasonable because renegotiation could cause changes of PPP contracts, which would result in 
subsequent risks. For example, renegotiation was believed to lead to more disputes and arguments between 
the public and private sectors. Because of strong background of public sectors, renegotiation would result 
in unfairness for the private sectors (Cruz and Marques 2013). Simultaneously, the termination payment to 
private sector is viewed as an effective method to reduce RVR without renegotiation (Chou et al. 2012).   
 
Findings from survey 
 
Based on the open-ended questionnaire survey, some important findings can be derived. The respondents 
opined that current PPP contracts cannot resolve the problems related to maintenance, technology progress, 
and facility renewal in a long-term concession period, and consequently recognized the significance of 
RVR.  
 
Although most respondents agreed with the authors’ definition on RVR, some suggested using the 
stakeholder perspective to improve the definition. Accordingly, the definition of RVR in PPPs is revised to 
“the risk that on expiry or earlier termination of the services contract, the asset (tangible or intangible) is 
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not in accordance with the value originally estimated by government, at which the private party agreed to 
transfer it to government, where public sectors could suffer loss of the residual value, and the private sector 
partner also could suffer a loss of compensation from the government due to different residual value”. 
 
The interpretation of RVR can be obtained from the description of respondents’ opinions on the contents of 
RVR. As mentioned before, residual value in PPP projects includes tangible and intangible assets. 
According to the character of different content above, facilities, technical documents, equipment, and 
instruments belong to tangible assets.  Concurrently, project organization, intellectual property, project 
reputation and goodwill, and market shares belong to intangible assets. Both tangible and intangible assets 
greatly contribute to the RV. Any losses in tangible and intangible assets could result in RVR. Because of 
the diversification of the representation form of RVR, the method to treat RVR can be complicated in 
reduce the risks. According to the survey results, a contractual arrangement is one of the most commonly 
used management and treatment methods. However, the contractual arrangement is also a compromising 
approach because rigid contract clauses could not completely allow any change in the project. Thus, a 
dynamic risk management method is needed, in which the critical factors that influence RV of PPP projects 
should be identified first. 
 
A conceptual framework of critical factors leading to RVR 
 
Identification of critical factors leading to RVR 
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Though RVR has been redefined from stakeholder perspectives and the loss of compensation from 
government due to excess residual value also has been considered, the authors still concentrate on the loss 
of RV in RVR from the perspective of public sectors.  
 
In the context of projects, risk is a factor that can jeopardize the successful conclusion of a project by 
causing cost overruns, time delay, and under-specification. All projects have risks associated with them, and 
the extent to which a risk factor exists within a particular area is related negatively to the likelihood of a 
successful outcome to the project (Chapman 2006). Hence, the critical factors leading to RVR should 
positively impact on the final loss of RV in PPP projects.  
 
In prior studies, risk factors of PPP projects have been identified from various perspectives. Shen et al. 
(2006) group risks in PPPs into project-related, government-related, client-related, design-related, 
contractor-related, consultant-related, and market-related risks. Unkovski and Pienaar (2009) categorize 
PPP risks into technical, financial and legal dimension. Xu et al. (2010) identify six risk factors including 
macroeconomic risk, construction and operation risk, government maturity risk, market environment risk, 
and government intervention risk by using factor analysis. Furthermore, all risk factors in PPPs identified 
by different research are similar, as concluded by Cheung and Chan (2011). All these risk factors can be 
classified into external risks and internal risks. External risks in PPPs come from the external environment 
of PPP projects and are relatively uncontrollable (Frilet 1997; Wang et al. 2000). Internal risks come from 
the internal environment and are relatively more controllable and will vary between projects. All external 
risks would indirectly impact on PPP projects combining with the influence of internal risk factors.  
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When identifying the critical factors leading to RVR, a similar framework can be used. The factors can be 
divided into external and internal risk factors. With respect to external risks, there is a need for the 
continual scanning and forecasting of these risks and for the development of the project for responding to 
the effects of external forces because of their uncontrollable nature. The external factors contain the 
changes of political, social, legal, economic conditions of specific PPP project. As a result of the indirect 
impact of external factors, these external risk factors are similar in different PPP projects, and their 
descriptions are also similar to prior works on risk factors of PPP projects explored by Shen et al. (2006). 
Hence, the authors are focusing on internal factors leading to RVR. For PPPs, different PPP projects have 
different characteristics. Thus the internal factors leading RVR would be different. However, RVs at the end 
of the PPP contract are similar to those presented in the survey results, which are tangible assets (facilities, 
technical documents, equipment, and instruments) and intangible assets (project organization, intellectual 
property, project reputation and goodwill, and market shares). Consequently, critical factors must have 
cause-and-effect connections with any losses of tangible or intangible assets. Meanwhile, PPP projects are 
designed and planned to provide specific public goods and services to meet the requirements of the public 
sector and the general public. In this case, 6 critical factors are identified by authors based on the 
requirements of the public sector and general public and cause-and-effect relationship between the critical 
factors and RV.  
 
The 6 critical factors include Downfall of product or service performance, Functional problems, Decrease 
of profitability and low possibility of being refinanced, Deterioration of maintainability, Decline of 
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operability, Failure of sustainability. From the perspective of public goods or services provided by PPP 
projects, the need for public facilities means high project quality as well as timely and convenient service 
(Li et al. 2005; Yuan et al. 2009), which strongly influence the level of performance and the completeness 
of the functions that are the content of the tangible assets of RV. At the same time, good financial 
management would support development of PPP projects (Xenidis and Angelides 2005; Wibowo et al 
2012). Otherwise, RV would be reduced if the financial conditions cannot be well kept. Therefore, another 
important factor influencing the RVR should come from financial and financing aspect, where profitability 
and the ability to refinance are both important. Furthermore, both tangible and intangible assets in the RV 
of PPPs can be enhanced when the work on maintenance and operation are well organized (Sharma 2007; 
Chan et al. 2009), on the basis of which continuous improvement can be provided during longstanding 
operation period on PPP projects. Moreover, social, environmental, and financial sustainability in PPPs can 
provide a good basis for long-term realization, maintenance, and operation of public infrastructures 
(Koppenjan and Enserink 2009). Detailed justification and description of 6 factors are presented below.  
 
Downfall of product or service performance - Performance hereby focuses on goods and services 
delivered by PPPs (Cliftona and Duffield 2006). For example, high performance in a highway project 
means short traffic time, high safety, and comfortable travel. Therefore, more congestion, traffic accidents, 
low quality pavement indicate a decline in performance. Once a PPP project cannot achieve the prescribed 
performance, the reputation of the project could be harmed, the market share would decrease, and the 
project organization would be questioned by general public (Efficiency Unit of Hong Kong 2003). 
Meanwhile, more vehicles also would damage the facilities and equipment. Although the problem could be 
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resolved in a short time, the influence could be long-term and invisible. Hence, the decline of performance 
would greatly influence RV of PPPs. This kind of decline could result from unreasonable design, low 
construction quality, outdated technologies, unmanageable organization, and maintenance cost overrun.  
 
Functional problems - Necessary function traditionally is the basis for providing quality goods and 
services for a public facility (Ravindran 2010). A series of facilities, equipment, instruments, and technical 
or management documents would be used in a PPP projects to meet the function requirements in order to 
ensure that high performance can be achieved. For instance, effective traffic control, strict traffic isolation 
by different subsidiary facilities, high design standard of pavement, and perfect service facilities are very 
important for a highway project. Functional problems can be described as lacking or missing certain 
functions that can meet the prescribed requirements in PPP contract. Functional problems would lead to 
dissatisfaction of users, further damage of related facilities, equipment, and instruments, negative impact on 
reputation and goodwill, and decreased market shares.  
 
Decrease of profitability and low possibility of being refinanced- Profitability refers to the potential of a 
PPP project to be financially successful (European Commission 2003). This may be assessed before 
investment or it may be used to analyze a project that is currently operating. When there is constant or 
abundant cash flow, it can be difficult to determine profitability. Spending and earning money, however, 
does not mean a project is in a healthy financial state. To determine profitability, it is necessary to access 
the price of the goods or services being offered. There are several things that need to be considered when 
prices are established, including variable costs and fixed costs. Hence prices and costs are the most 
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important factors for profitability. Meanwhile, low profitability would lead to a lower possibility of being 
refinanced when a PPP project is transferred. In this case, refinancing has changed from an attractive 
opportunity to become a risk for RV. As concluded by Salman et al. (2007), financial ability is critical to the 
viability for a PPP project. Decrease of profitability and the low possibility of being refinanced are very 
dangerous to a PPP project due to potentially small investments on tangible and intangible assets.   
 
Deterioration of maintainability- It is the ease with which a project can be maintained in order to isolate 
defects or their causes, correct defects or their causes, meet new requirements, make future maintenance 
easier, and cope with a changed environment (Li et al. 2005; Chan et al. 2009). In some cases, 
maintainability involves a system of continuous improvement - learning from the past in order to improve 
the ability to maintain systems, or to improve reliability of systems based on maintenance experience. Thus 
effective maintainability, which relies on reasonable planning and design, effective quality and cost control, 
can substantially improve reliability and serviceability for infrastructure projects, and therefore would 
reduce RVR.  
 
Decline of operability- Operability is the ability to keep a system or a whole PPP project in a safe and 
reliable functioning condition, according to predefined operational requirements. Moreover, operability 
stresses that not only tangible assets but also intangible assets can be operated well. For tangible assets, 
facilities, technical documents, equipment, and instruments should be kept at a high level. For intangible 
assets, operability refers that every ingredients of the whole project including stakeholders, sub-systems, 
and interface of different project phases or contracts should be integrated together by technology progress 
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and efficient project organization, which is also called as interoperability (Sharma 2007). Therefore, RV is 
also strongly influenced by operability.  
 
Failure of sustainability- The PPP infrastructures are supposed to keep up with living standards and to 
create conditions for sustainable development. Sustainable development was defined by the Brundtland 
Commission in 1987 as development that fulfills the needs of the present generation without compromising 
the ability of future generations to fulfill their needs (World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987). Sustainability in PPPs is defined by Koppenjan and Enserink (2009) as social, environmental, and 
financial sustainability. Social sustainability refers to the impacts of PPP projects on the affordability of and 
access to public service delivery by poorer groups within society. Environmental sustainability refers to the 
impacts of PPP projects on the related population (health, well-being), environments (air quality, water 
quality), and the wider surroundings (ecological impacts, energy use). Financial sustainability refers to the 
possibility of local authorities living up to the financial obligations that result from investments in PPP 
projects in the long run. As a result, sustainable development is a process of harmoniously exploiting 
resources, directing investment, and accomplishing institutional change to enhance both current and future 
potential to meet present and future needs (Mirza 2006). In other words, long-term improvement of RV 
after a project is transferred is firmly affected by sustainability.  
 
Establishment of conceptual model 
 
Although the aforementioned 6 critical factors leading to RVR have been identified, the occurrence of RVR 
Journal of Management in Engineering. Submitted October 3, 2012; September 4, 2013; 
 posted ahead of print September 6, 2013. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000256
Copyright 2013 by the American Society of Civil Engineers
J. Manage. Eng. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 a
sc
el
ib
ra
ry
.o
rg
 b
y 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
Po
ly
te
ch
ni
c 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
n 
09
/0
8/
13
. C
op
yr
ig
ht
 A
SC
E.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y;
 al
l r
ig
ht
s r
es
er
ve
d.
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
No
t C
op
ye
dit
ed
 28 / 51 
 
however is a complicated and long-term process through the whole concession period. Actually, the 
interaction among risk factors of PPPs and their changes during the concession period could finally result in 
RVR due to long-term cumulative impacts, which means many risk factors of a PPP project would impact 
on the final RV.  Certainly, some changed risks only affect a particular activity or individual aspect of 
project performance, but it is clear that few risks occur in isolation. The cumulative impacts of different risk 
factors reflect a broadened perspective on the nature of interactions. This perspective acknowledges that: 
 
Firstly, RV change originates not only from single factor but also from interactions of multiple factors. 
These interactions need to be considered in risk planning and monitoring to ensure that RV limits are not 
breached; and Secondly, change accumulates through additive or interactive processes. The impact of two 
actions on the RV can be complex and may result in loss of RV that is worse than originally thought 
because of interactions between factors.  
 
Hence, a conceptual framework of critical factors leading to loss of RV can be established on the basis of 
literature review, survey results, and viewpoint of cumulative impacts. The proposed framework is shown 
in Figure 2.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
In Figure 2, the proposed model cannot only help industry and academia identify the critical factors of RVR, 
but also help managers further identify the Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) of RVR in different stages. KRIs are 
measures used in management to indicate how risky an activity is. Therefore, KRIs identified by 6 risk 
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factors can be used to measure RVR. KRIs play critical roles in risk management framework. As tools for 
monitoring controls, risk drivers, and exposures, they can shed light on the potential risk events. As 
presented by Beasley et al. (2010), a goal of developing an effective set of KRIs is to identify the relevant 
metrics that provide useful insights about potential risks that may have an impact on the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives. In the context of RVR of PPP projects, the selection and design of effective KRIs 
starts with a firm grasp of objectives for RVR management and risk-related events that might affect the 
achievement of those objectives. In our research, the objectives for RVR management are the improvement 
of tangible and intangible assets that can be viewed as strategic initiatives in the management process. The 
identified 6 risk factors are the potential risk-related events that are important linkages between RVR and 
KRIs and can be used to identify KRIs. The linkage of RVR to core strategies helps pinpoint the most 
relevant information that might serve as an effective leading indicator of an emerging RVR. Therefore 
KRIs can be identified from the project stage-based perspective according to the above-mentioned 
relationship between KRIs and RVR. The findings of this research can provide the foundation for future 
work on identification of KRIs. 
 
The framework can clearly present how RVR comes into being.  
Firstly, the model consists of 6 internal critical factors and one external risk factor group as shown in 
Figure 2. These factors, which can be measured by different KRIs in different stages, would impact on the 
RV of PPP projects in the lifecycle. The identified 6 internal factors would concurrently affect RV during 
whole concession period. Meanwhile, these factors could change from one stage to the next stage. In 
different stages, critical factors leading to RVR would impact on RV and potentially result in loss of RV. 
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These factors would then still exist or be transformed to other factors in the next stage, and keep on 
influencing RV. Finally, RV would suffer great losses due to the aforementioned cumulative impacts 
through the entire project implementation. 
 
Secondly, the proposed conceptual model is a project stage-based framework. The influence of identified 
factors would vary in different stages. There are many leading indicators (KRIs) that can indicate how the 
risk factors influence the RV. The list detailed KRIs is not provided in this paper because KRIs would vary 
in different PPP projects. More case studies would be helpful for the identification of KRIs. On the other 
hand, the proposed model allows that KRIs can flexibly change when the projects move from one stage to 
another. For example, the indicators in the stage of pre-construction could be related to the problems like 
the quality of planning, the selection of concessionaire, the appropriateness of financing, the reasonableness 
of technologies, and the speed of land acquirement. Some of these problems could be resolved within the 
stage of pre-construction. Other unresolved problems would still impact on subsequent stages of the project. 
Thus the influence of identified factors during the construction period may change. For example, design 
problems could be invisible in the pre-construction stage, which would result in quality problems in the 
construction stage and maintenance stage. Hence, the critical factors may change quantitively and 
qualitatively (e.g. downfall of product or service performance could be enlarged or functional problems 
change due to deterioration of maintainability in different stages). In the construction stage, the identified 
factors will keep changing due to cost overruns, poor quality, delayed completion, and resource overuse. 
Unresolved problems in the construction stage would influence project operation. The operation period is 
divided into the early stage of operation and the late stage of operation because of great differences 
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between the early and late periods of operation. In the early stage of operation, external factors could still 
be unchanged. The possible loss of RV at this stage could result from operation cost overruns, low standard 
service, maintenance cost overrun, market changes, price changes, and environmental changes. In the late 
stage of operation, all external factors could change because of the long time since the concession 
agreement was signed. In this case, external factors should be re-evaluated in the late stage of operation. At 
the same time, technologies used in PPP projects would become outdated or inappropriate at this stage, 
which is not necessary considered in the early stage of operation. Furthermore, physical problems such as 
damage to structures, equipment, labor, etc. are more critical during the late operation phases of the projects 
(Iyer and Sagheer 2010). Similarly, the market and environment would also be different. Hence related 
factors also should be re-considered.  
 
Thirdly, the identified 6 risk factors always exist in any stage of a PPP project, but the KRIs would change 
in different stages. The 6 risk factors could finally impact on the RV through the cumulative impacts of 
multiple project stages. The cumulative impacts on the change of RV in PPP projects are very important 
reasons for causing the loss of tangible assets and intangible assets at any time within concession period. 
(Algarni et al. 2007). During long-term process of planning, construction, operation, and transfer, the public 
sector is indeed the organizer that can greatly influence the success of a PPP project. However, the public 
sector may neglect the impact of residual value change and the risk may be huge when the project is being 
transferred because of the cumulative effects (Fandel et al 2012; Regan et al 2011). Many PPP projects 
were designed to provide quality public goods and services through good construction and operation by the 
private sector during the concession period (Ng et al. 2010; Chan et al. 2010). Although many PPP projects 
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may have a clear specification (HM Treasury of UK 2007), RVR occurs and leads to high loss of residual 
value (Private Finance Panel 1996) because the RVR is influenced by many factors including performance, 
function, profitability and the possibility of refinancing, maintainability, operability, and sustainability, as 
shown in proposed conceptual model. 
 
Furthermore, the proposed model can be used to track and monitor the change of RV during the concession 
period for improving the RVR management. In Figure 2, the relationships amongst RVR, 6 risk factors, and 
KRIs are clearly presented. The cause-and-effect relationship between KRIs and 6 risk factors can be used 
to find how the RVR occurs in a real PPP project. As shown in Figure 3, 6 KRIs during the period of 
construction in a PPP tunnel project in Nanjing, China have been identified (The detailed information can 
be found in Yuan et al. 2010 a). The external impacts were from Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
political pressure to facilitate the construction, and the inflation led by GFC, on the basis of which 6 risk 
factors leading to RVR can be indicated by 6 KRIs (e.g. complexity, costs, schedule, quality, and Health 
Safety Environment (HSE) of construction). Meanwhile, the financing problem would also be very 
important. Thus the KRIs can be identified as well, and can be used to track and monitor the change of RV. 
In other stages, a similar method can be adopted by using 6 risk factors and corresponding KRIs in each 
stages, which can help both the public and private sectors track the change of RV and improve the level of 
RVR management to deliver VfM. In this case, the RVR management can be better conducted by using the 
conceptual model to minimize the incongruence between the prescribed performance in the PPP contract 
and the actual performance. As presented by Appuhami et al. (2011), two strategies named the Performance 
Evaluation Strategy (PES) and the Trust-based Strategy (TBS) can be useful to enhance the RVR 
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management. In the proposed model, the goal of RVR management is to improve the tangible and 
intangible assets. In order to achieve the goal, the efforts to minimize the effects of goal incongruence by 
PES and to make the partners like-minded by TBS can all be made on the basis of conceptual model. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Conclusions 
 
Given the increased needs for public facilities and the lack of funds and skills to lifecycle management of 
existing facilities, PPPs have been used extensively and have contributed to the development of 
infrastructures in many countries. However, the problems related to the management of on-going PPP 
projects when transferred to the public sector have not been studies thoroughly. The RVR has been 
identified as an important risk in PPPs at the time of project transfer, but the perception and definition of 
RVR in PPP projects, the contents and changes of RV during concession period, and the treatment methods 
of RVR are not clear, which leads to disputes between public and private sectors, unsuccessful project 
transfer, and great losses in project value. Therefore, the benefits to the general public, who are the 
end-users of PPP projects, could be influenced greatly. Therefore, this study is focusing on the perception 
of RVR in PPP projects.  
 
Based on the extensive review of relevant research papers, the meaning of RV in PPPs is explored based on 
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two aspects, tangible and intangible assets. By using an open-end questionnaire, the RVR’s significance, 
the initial definition proposed by authors, the contents, and the treatment methods were discussed with 46 
PPP experts and professionals. Most of the respondents (95%) considered that RVR was an important or 
extremely important issue in PPPs. According to the opinions of the respondents, the definition of RVR in 
PPPs can be proposed as “the risk that on expiry or earlier termination of the services contract, the asset 
(tangible asset and intangible asset) is not in accord with the value originally estimated by government at 
which the private party agreed to transfer it to government, and where public sectors could suffer loss of 
residual value, and the private sector also could suffer loss of compensation from the government due to 
excess residual value”. The contents of RVR in PPPs can be concluded as facilities, technical documents, 
project organization, equipment, intellectual property, instruments, project reputation and goodwill, and 
market shares. However, there are very different opinions on the treatment methods of RVR. Though the 
contract was considered as an effective approach to manage, control and reduce RVR, the agreement cannot 
predict the long-term changes. Renegotiation was proposed as a possible method to resolve problems.  
 
On the basis of the survey results, a conceptual model is established with six risk factors leading to RVR 
including: (1) Downfall of product or service performance; (2) Functional problems; (3) Decrease of 
profitability and low possibility of being refinanced; (4) Deterioration of maintainability; (5) Decline of 
operability; (6) Failure of sustainability. A critical contribution of the proposed model is to identify the 
cumulative impacts of the interactions of different risk factors on the RV changes, which can reflect a 
dynamic situation in a PPP project and help the public sectors measure RVR and find ways to reduce RVR. 
The conceptual model can be used to explain how the RVR occurs, how the RV changes, and which factors 
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would influence the RVR.  
 
This study gives an overall view on the RVR of PPP projects, which could help the public and the private 
sectors understand that RVR management is very important and should be managed from the proposed six 
perspectives. As different risk factors have their corresponding leading indicators, further research should 
identify detailed KRIs that are belong to specific risk factors at different project stages and can indicate the 
risk factors leading to RVR. Future works also should focus on the exact nature and measurement of the 
RVR. Such research may hopefully provide a RVR prediction model based on actual project data.  
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Appendix 1: The questionnaire  
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 Table lists  
Table 1 The detailed information about sent and returned questionnaire in survey  
Table 2 The background information of respondents in survey  
Table 3 The survey results  
Table 4 The respondents’ additional opinions on the definition of RVR in PPPs  
Table 5 Main contents of RV in PPPs  
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Table 1 The detailed information about sent and returned questionnaire in survey 
All respondents 
Sent questionnaires Returned questionnaire 
Effective 
returned rate n 
Percentage to total 
sent questionnaire 
n 
effective returned 
questionnaire 
Percentage to total 
returned questionnaire 
Private Sectors 37 30.58  11 13 28.26  35.14  
Public Sectors 45 37.19  24 22 47.83  48.89  
Academia 39 32.23  13 11 23.91  28.21  
Total 121 100.00  48 46 100.00  38.02  
 
 
Table 2 The background information of respondents in survey 
 
Type of PPP projects that the survey respondents have been involved with 
 Hospital Transportation 
Water, Sanitation,  
and Water treatment 
Power and 
Energy 
Public 
housing 
Police & 
Prison 
School & 
Education 
Sports 
Number of 
participated 
PPP projects 
11 21 13 10 8 3 3 1 
percentage 15.71 30.00 18.57 14.29 11.43 4.29 4.29 1.43 
Respondents’ experiences in construction industry 
 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 21 years and above 
Number 11 19 7 6 3 
percentage 23.91 41.30 15.22 13.04 6.52 
Respondents’ experiences in PPPs 
 None 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 
Number 12 15 17 1 1 
percentage 26.09 32.61 36.96 2.17 2.17 
Accepted Manuscript 
Not Copyedited
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Table 3 The survey results  
1 Respondents' opinion on the significance of RVR 
Significance 
Extremely  
important 
Very important Important Maybe important Not important 
N 27 12 5 2 0 
Percentage 58 25 12 5 0 
Detailed description of scale: 
Extremely important- If the RVR has been considered very urgent and has been included in the contract of PPPs for the 
same respondent, the significance of RVR for this respondent is extremely important.  
Very important- If the RVR has been considered very urgent for the respondent and has not been included in the 
contract of PPPs for the same respondent, the significance of RVR for this respondent is very important. Or If the RVR 
has been considered urgent for the respondent and has been included in the contract of PPPs for the same respondent, 
the significance of RVR for this respondent is very important. (In this level, RVR has considered in the contract by 5 
respondents, and has not been considered in the contract by 7 respondents.) 
Important- If the RVR has been considered urgent and has not been included in the contract of PPPs for the same 
respondent, the significance of RVR for this respondent is important. 
Maybe Important- If the RVR has been considered maybe urgent and has not been included in the contract of PPPs for 
the same respondent, the significance of RVR for this respondent is maybe important. 
Not important- If the RVR has been considered not urgent and has not been included in the contract of PPPs for the 
same respondent, the significance of RVR for this respondent is not important. 
 
Notice: The above-mentioned urgency scale from “very urgent” to “not urgent” is judged according to the answers of 
question 3 for different respondents.  
2 Respondents' opinion on the definition of RVR 
Opinions 
Agree  
authors’ pre-definition 
Basically agree  
authors’ pre-definition 
Do not agree 
authors’ pre-definition 
N 36 10 0 
Percentage 78.25 21.75 0 
 
3 Respondents' opinion on the contents of RVR 
Assets 1 Tangible assets 
Detail Facilities Technical documents Equipment Instruments 
Percentage 100 95 87 65 
Assets 2 Intangible assets 
Detail Project organization Intellectual property Project goodwill Market 
percentage 95 86 54 49 
 
4 Respondents' opinion on the treatments of RVR by using contractual methods 
Opinions 
Has RVR been considered in contract? 
YES 
NO Can the contract be revised or renegotiated on the case of RVR? 
YES NO 
N 19 13 14 
Percentage 41 30 29 
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Table 4 The respondents’ additional opinions on the definition of RVR in PPPs  
Respondents  Respondents’ additional opinions 
on the definition of RVRs 
Possible solutions 
Opinion 1  At the end of contract, public 
sectors not only could suffer 
residual value loss, but also could 
acquire additional value. 
S1-Losses and benefits of RV change should be 
studied simultaneously in order to balance the 
relationship between public and private sectors. 
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011) 
Opinion 2 Private sectors should be involved 
in RVR definition for the reason 
that different stakeholders would 
have relationships with RVR.  
S2-Private sectors have very strong relationship 
with RV. The role of private sectors should be 
carefully considered in the definition of RVR. 
Meanwhile, favorable communication between 
public and private sectors should be encouraged 
to produce the trust for all stakeholders 
(Appuhami et al. 2011).  
 
Opinion 3 The specifications for returning 
projects back to public are very 
important.  
S3-Too detailed and explicit specifications were 
believed by respondents not practicable and could 
influence the flexibility of agreement owning to 
long-term concession period 
S4-RVR should be dynamically managed by 
using process-based method (Cliftona and 
Duffield 2006). 
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Table 5 Main contents of RV in PPPs  
Main contents Explanation  References or examples 
Tangible 
assets 
Facilities immovable property (e.g. 
building, road, bridge, and related 
supporting facilities) 
Koppenjan and Enserink 2009 
Equipment the contents of equipment in a 
specific PPP project depend on its 
type.  
In a healthcare center, equipment 
include building services and fittings 
equipment, minor clinical equipment 
office and major clinical equipment, and 
relocated equipment supplied by HAC, 
etc. 
Instruments technical and scientific device for 
collecting data used in 
measurement and comparison 
medical instruments, weather 
instruments, vehicle instruments 
Technical 
documents 
all technical documents related to 
construction, maintenance, and 
operation 
In a PPP project, technical document 
would include economic and financial, 
engineering, institutional, geographical, 
and , some specific documents (Asian 
Development Bank 2005) 
Intangible 
assets 
Project 
organization 
covers wide contents including 
manpower of projects, 
management system and 
specification in organization  
Ruuskaa and Teigland 2009 
Intellectual 
property 
include copyrights, trademarks, pa
tents, design, drawings and trade 
secrets in some jurisdictions 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011 
Project 
reputation 
and goodwill 
reputation means the opinion 
(more technically, a social 
evaluation) of stakeholders 
toward PPP project and related 
organization and a group of 
people; goodwill was originally 
used in accounting to express the 
intangible but quantifiable 
"prudent value" of an ongoing 
business beyond its assets 
Ruuskaa and Teigland 2009; Reeves 
2008 
Market 
shares 
the percentage of a market 
(defined in terms of either units or 
revenue) accounted for by a 
specific entity 
Bloomfield 2006 
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Fig. 1 The research flow in the paper
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Fig. 2 The conceptual model of RVR in PPP projects
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Fig. 3 The KRIs in construction period for RVR in a PPP project
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